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I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently issued two important deci-
sions concerning the interpretation of express easements.' Both cases in-
volved gas pipeline easements over and through rural land. In each case
the controversy centered on the extent of the easement, which was de-S
scribed in indefinite terms by the grant. In Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v.
Great Lakes Transmission Co.,4 the issue was whether the pipeline company's
general "right of ingress and egress" to its pipeline needed to be exercised
t J.D. Candidate May 2000, William Mitchell College of Law; Ph.D., History,
1993, Northwestern University; B.A., University of Minnesota, 1985.
1. See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998);
Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co., 565 N.W.2d 23
(Minn. 1997).
2. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 579; Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25.
3. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 579; Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 26.
4. 565 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 1997).
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in a "reasonable" fashion. In Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,6 the fo-
cus was the meaning and extent of the utility's blanket easement grant,
which described the whole property rather than the specific location of
the pipeline. 7 The issue was whether the grant included the right to relo-
cate the pipe elsewhere on the property.
The Minnesota Supreme Court gave an expansive interpretation of
both easements, ruling against the landowner in each case.9 Despite im-
precision and omissions in the terms of the grants, the court held that
both instruments were clear, unambiguous and complete expressions of
the easement. 0 As such, the court refused to circumscribe in any way the
language of the grants or the boundaries of the easements.
This note analyzes these decisions in light of traditional principles
for interpretation of easements. Section II lays out the basic rules govern-
ing construction of express easements, and the application of such rules
to indefinite rights of way and indefinite utility easements. Section III dis-
cusses the background facts and particular holdings of the two cases. Sec-
tion IV analyzes the decisions, arguing that they involve misapplication of
established interpretive principles and serious misconstructions of the
easement grants. Section V concludes by emphasizing that these cases
represent a serious and disturbing departure from established law.
II. INTERPRETATION OF INDEFINITE EASEMENTS
The Minnesota courts have used a standard set of principles for con-
struing indefinite easements. These principles restrict the easement, con-
fining it to firm boundaries and reasonable usage. The courts have re-
fused to treat indefinite grants as unrestricted grants.
A. Basic Rules of Interpretation for Express Easements
The extent of an easement depends on the intentions of the original
parties. As an early Minnesota decision stated, "The cardinal rule of con-
struction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties toII2
the deed."I Intention is "the essence of every agreement," and the
5. Id. at 26.
6. 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998).
7. See id. at 580.
8. See id.
9. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 581; Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 27.
10. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 580-81; Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at
26-27.
11. Witt v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 122, 127, 35 N.W. 862, 864
(1888); see also Fames v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 226, 161 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1968)
(stating that construction of ambiguous writings aims to ascertain the parties' in-
tent).
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courts should construe the easement in conformity therewith unless pre-
vented by a rule controlling the creation of easements. 3 The parties' in-
tention involves their agreement about such things as length, width and
location.14 More fundamentally, however, it involves their "purpose" for'5
making the agreement. As one decision noted, the parties to an instru-
ment have "some definite and specific object or purpose in view" as ex-
pressed by their language, and the "sole office of the rules ofjudicial con-
struction is to ascertain and declare that purpose."16
The primary source for determining the parties' intention is the lan-17
guage of the grant. When an easement results from a written convey-
ance, "its extent depends entirely upon the construction of the terms of
the grant." The grant "fixes" the easement's extent, such that no inter-
12. Sanborn v. City of Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 314, 317, 29 N.W. 126, 126
(1886) (interpreting a deed as granting an easement of way rather than an estate
in land).
13. See Aldrich v. Soucheray, 133 Minn. 382, 385, 158 N.W. 637, 639 (1916).
14. These qualities are the primary physical attributes of right of way ease-
ments. SeeJON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS & LICENSES IN
LAND 7.02[2] [b], at 7-6-7-7 (rev. ed. 1995).
15. See Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 545
(Minn. 1983) (permitting use of a railroad easement for a public footpath because
the latter use is "consistent with the purpose for which the easement was originally
acquired"); Fames, 281 Minn. at 226, 161 N.W.2d at 300 (stating that courts should
construe an ambiguous easement as giving the grantee the fullest use of the ease-
ment "consistent with its purpose").
The purpose of the easement provides a strong indication of its scope.
One treatise notes that "[i]n determining the extent of a right-of-way, it is proper
to consider the whole scope and purpose of the deed creating it, the manifest in-
tent of the parties in its execution, and the situation of the property." 2 GEORGE
W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 386, at 561
(John S. Grimes ed., 1961). The same authority states that "[t]he purpose for
which an easement is established is the test for determining the mode and extent
of its user." Id. at 563.
16. Security Trust Co. v. Joesting, 96 Minn. 163, 167, 104 N.W. 830, 832
(1905) (construing an ambiguous deed); see also Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422,
426, 272 N.W. 270, 273 (1937) (holding that the court should seek the intentions
of the parties in construing an indefinite easement).
17. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 483 cmt. d (1944) ("So far as language is
capable of performing the function for which it was chosen, it is the primary
source for the ascertainment of the meaning of a conveyance."). Several leading
Minnesota decisions have relied on the Restatement of Property for interpretation of
express easement grants. See, e.g., Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l
Bank, 256 N.W.2d 271, 275 (Minn. 1977) (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 482-
83); Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 258, 177 N.W.2d 786,
789 (1970) (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 482); Fames, 281 Minn. at 226, 161
N.W.2d at 300 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 483).
18. Highway 7Embers, 256 N.W.2d at 275.
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pretation can contradict its terms.'9 If the grant is clear and unambigu-
ous, the court must consider only the terms of the grant, excluding all ex-
trinsic evidence.
20
In interTreting the grant, Minnesota courts apply various rules of
construction. They construe the entire grant rather than a detached
part of it,22 and they seek to "harmonize and unite" inconsistent provisions
23in accordance with the plain intentions of the parties. They ignore the
technical meaning of words if literal interpretation would defeat the par-
24ties' clear intention. Finally, the courts construe doubtful terms in favor
19. See Minneapolis Athletic Club, 287 Minn. at 258, 177 N.W.2d at 789 ("The
process which creates an easement necessarily fixes its extent and therefore the
extent of the easement created by a conveyance is fixed by the terms of the con-
veyance."); see also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 482 (1944) ("The extent of an
easement created by a conveyance is fixed by the conveyance.").
20. See generally Highway 7 Embers, 256 N.W.2d at 275 (holding that "circum-
stances surrounding the grant" may be considered only when ambiguities exist in
the terms of the grant). The heavy emphasis placed upon the granting language is
shown by the rule that nonuse of an express easement will not result in its extinc-
tion. See Simms v. William Simms Hardware, Inc., 216 Minn. 290, 291, 12 N.W.2d
783, 787 (1943); Pergament v. Loring Properties, Ltd., 586 N.W.2d 778, 782
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
21. Recent Minnesota decisions suggest that construction of the grant should
occur before any finding of ambiguity therein. See Lien v. Loraus, 403 N.W.2d
286, 288 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the extent of an express easement
"depends entirely upon the construction of the terms of the grant. Only when
ambiguities exist may the circumstances surrounding the grant be considered.");
see also Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn.
1983); Highway 7 Embers, 256 N.W.2d at 275. This procedure contradicts previous
Minnesota decisions. See, e.g., Security Trust Co. v. Joesting, 96 Minn. 163, 166,
104 N.W. 830, 832 (1905) (stating that the court should use rules of construction
to ascertain the parties' intention only when it "is not made clear by their written
contract"). It also departs from standard practice in other jurisdictions, which
generally apply the rules of construction only after finding the instrument to be
ambiguous. See 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 82.13(a) (4) & 82.13(b), at 408-
10, 412 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
22. SeeWittv. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 122,127,35 N.W. 862, 864-65
(1888) (holding that "the court must consider all parts of the instrument, and the
construction must be upon the entire deed, and not upon disjointed parts of it");
Sanborn v. City of Minneapolis, 35 Minn. 314, 317, 29 N.W. 126, 126 (1886) (stat-
ing that the court must construe the "entire deed").
23. Joesting, 96 Minn. at 167, 104 N.W. at 832; see also Romanchuk v. Plotkin,
215 Minn. 156, 164, 9 N.W.2d 421, 426 (1943) (stating that rules of construction
are interpretive aids for discovering intention and that the court must not destroy
"the plain intention of the parties as gathered from the entire instrument").
24. See Aldrich v. Soucheray, 133 Minn. 382, 385, 158 N.W. 637, 639 (1916)
(refusing to construe "excepting" according to its technical legal meaning). An-
other early decision stressed that the court must not place "too much stress.., on
the grammatical construction or forms of expression used" if a contrary intention
appears in the instrument, and that the grantor may convey an easement by adopt-
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25
of the grantee. If the scope of the easement becomes clear after applica-
26tion of these rules, the courts will enforce the grant as written.
The courts proceed to further analysis only if the grant remains am-
27
biguous. A finding of ambiguity is the "critical step" in interpretation of
easements, permitting the court to clarify and define the terms of the28
grant. Ambiguity in deeds is a somewhat malleable concept and occa-
sionally appears to. be "little more than an ipse dixit of the courts." How-
ever, ambiguity always involves indefiniteness in the terms of the grant,
such that "the extent of the easement is not clearly declared.
" s
3
Minnesota case law has recognized two main types of ambiguity. The
most common variety involves imprecise or contradictory language in the31
grant. In Ingelson v. Olson,32 for instance, the court held an easement
grant to be ambiguous because it used the words "approximately" and
'more or less" to describe the location of the servitude.3 3 Ambiguity of
this sort has been called "patent ambiguity" because it appears on the face
ing "any suitable language to evidence such intention." Witt, 38 Minn. at 127-28,
35 N.W. at 865.
25. See Romanchuk, 215 Minn. at 160, 9 N.W.2d at 424; Eastman v. St. Anthony
Falls Water-Power Co., 43 Minn. 60, 63, 44 N.W. 882, 883 (1890) (describing this
principle as a "well-established rule of construction"); Witt, 38 Minn. at 127, 35
N.W. at 864 (stating that "any ambiguity or uncertainty is to be resolved in favor of
the grantee"). This ancient rule actually rests on the "more precise rule that a
deed will be construed against the party responsible for its preparation." 9
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERY, supra note 21, § 82.13(b) (2), at 413. Nevertheless,
courts often apply it mechanically even when the grantee drafted the deed and
constituted the stronger and more sophisticated party. See id. § 82.13(e), at 423.
26. See Highway 7 Embers, 256 N.W.2d at 277 (holding that easement was "ca-
pable of exact interpretation," and therefore the court cannot modify it by equita-
ble interpretation); see also Oleson v. Bergwell, 204 Minn. 450, 454, 283 N.W. 770,
773 (1939) (stating that if the language of a contract is "plain and unambiguous,"
there will be "no room for construction"). For an overview of the rules for con-
struction of deeds, from the standpoint of Texas law, see Student Symposium, Op-
eration and Construction ofDeeds, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 806 (1975).
27. See Highway 7 Embers, 256 N.W.2d at 275 ("Only when ambiguities exist
may the circumstances surrounding the grant be considered.").
28. See9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERY, supra note 21, § 82.13(e), at 422.
29. Id. § 82.13(a)(4), at 411.
30. Kretz v. Fireproof Storage Co., 127 Minn. 304, 310, 149 N.W. 648, 651
(1914).
31. See, e.g., Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 425, 272 N.W. 270, 273 (1937)
(involving approximate description of right of way); Sandretto v. Wahlsten, 124
Minn. 331, 333-34, 144 N.W. 1089, 1090 (1914) (involving deed that contained two
inconsistent descriptions of the land); Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 423,
80 N.W. 360, 360 (1899) (involving right of way described as "upon or near" a
stated boundary line).
32. 199 Minn. 422, 272 N.W. 270 (1937).
33. See id. at 425, 272 N.W. at 273.
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of the document.34
The second type of ambiguity results from omission. It occurs
when the grant fails to specify important attributes of the easement, offer-
36
ing an "incomplete" description of the servitude. Such ambiguity usually
involves omission of key physical dimensions of the easement, such as its37
width or location within the servient tenement. It can also result from38
failure to specify the permissible burden of use on the easement. The
most striking decisions regarding "ambiguity by omission" have involved
rights of way leading to lakes.3 9 In Fames v. Lane40 and Lien v. Loraus,4 the
Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota Court of Appeals, respectively,
held lake passageway grants to be ambiguous because they failed to state
42
whether the grantees could build a dock at the water's edge. According
34. See 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 21, § 82.13(b)(1), at 411.
35. See Kretz, 127 Minn. at 310, 149 N.W. at 651 (holding that the court may
examine extrinsic evidence "when the extent of the easement is not clearly de-
clared"); see also 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACrS § 7.15-7.16,
at 327-38 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the problem of omissions in contract law).
36. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 14, 8.02[1], at 8-3-8-4 (stating that "where
the terms of the easement are imprecise or incomplete, courts consider other cir-
cumstances to aid their interpretation of the written instrument"). Discussing an
"incomplete" easement grant, one Minnesota decision explained that " [t] he rights
conveyed and reserved in this conveyance ... were for the court to ascertain, in
the absence of apt words in the reservation clauses expressing and defining those
rights." Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 271, 97 N.W. 973, 974 (1904).
In Minnesota, an easement grant need only describe the servient tene-
ment and the intention of the parties. See Ingelson, 199 Minn. at 427, 272 N.W. at
274. As a result, an instrument may omit key physical dimensions of the servitude
yet still remain a valid grant. See, e.g., Callen, 91 Minn. at 271, 97 N.W. at 974 (up-
holding a ight of way grant that omitted the course and entry points of the ease-
ment).
37. See Callen, 91 Minn. at 270-72, 97 N.W. at 973-74 (involving grant that
omitted the location of the way); Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 424, 80
N.W. 360, 361 (1899) (involving grant that failed to mention the width of the right
of way).
38. Giles v. Luker, 215 Minn. 256, 259-60, 9 N.W.2d 716, 718 (1943) (con-
cerning whether an easement to cross land "by foot or wagon" included use by
gravel trucks); Kretz v. Fireproof Storage Co., 127 Minn. 304, 310, 149 N.W. 648,
651 (1914) (involving a right of way to an identified lot that contained a building
covering two additional lots).
39. See Fames v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 161 N.W.2d 297 (1968); Lien v. Loraus,
403 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
40. 281 Minn. 222, 161 N.W.2d 297 (1968).
41. 403 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
42. See Fames, 281 Minn. at 225-26, 161 N.W.2d at 300-01 (holding that right
of way was uncertain for failure to mention the existence or non-existence of right
to build and use a dock); Lien, 403 N.W.2d at 288-89 (holding that grant of a pe-
destrian walkway to a lake, which made no mention of docking rights, was am-
biguous).
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to the courts, this omission made the easements uncertain and ambigu-
ous, even though the granting language was otherwise clear and unambi-
43
guoUS.
If the grant is ambiguous, the courts may resolve the uncertainty in
two ways. First, the court may examine the circumstances surrounding the• . 44
grant to determine the parties' intention. "As the language of the grant
becomes less precise," explained one decision, "the circumstances of the
grant grow in importance as an interpretive aid."4 5 In particular, courts
have considered such circumstances as the location and structural charac-
46 47
teristics of the land, previous use of the land by the grantor, and
48
(rarely) preliminary negotiations of the parties. Courts have also exam-
ined the "practical construction" of the grant, that is, how the original
49parties interpreted and exercised their respective rights under the grant.
43. See Fames, 281 Minn. at 225-26, 161 N.W.2d at 300-01; Lien, 403 N.W.2d at
288-89. Neither Lien nor Fames specified exactly why the lake access easements
were ambiguous. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, however, explained the
Fames holding in this manner: "generally, access to a body of water is sought for
particular purposes beyond merely reaching the water, and where such purposes
are not plainly indicated, a court may resort to extrinsic evidence to assist the
court in ascertaining what they may have been." Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 226
(Me. 1979) (interpreting Fames and Hudson v. Lee, 393 P.2d 515, 515 (Okla.
1964)). Other jurisdictions have also declared lake-access easements to be am-
biguous when they fail to mention docking rights. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Houk, 644
N.E. 2d 597, 601 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Walter W. Krieger, Recent Developments in
Property Law, 25 IND. L. REV. 1375, 1383-86 (1992) (discussing three cases that held
omission of docking rights made easement grants ambiguous).
44. See Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 256 N.W.2d 271,
275 (Minn. 1977).
45. Id. (paraphrasing the RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 483 cmt. d (1944)).
46. See Kretz v. Fireproof Storage Co., 127 Minn. 304, 309-10, 149 N.W. 648,
651 (1914) (holding that an appurtenant easement granted for one lot also served
adjoining lots when a single building stood on all the lots at the time of the grant);
Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 272, 97 N.W. 973, 974 (1904) (stating that when
the language of a reservation is indefinite, the court should examine among other
things "the nature and situation of the property conveyed").
47. See Callen, 91 Minn. at 272, 97 N.W. at 974 (stating that grantor's use of
easement before the grant may be considered in determining which lands were
benefited by the grant); see also Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 215, 101
N.W.2d 213, 222 (1960) (holding that "[w]here a way is granted without fixing its
location, but there is a way already located at the time of the grant, such way will
be held to be the location of the way granted unless a contrary intention ap-
pears").
48. See Sandretto v. Wahlsten, 124 Minn. 331, 334, 144 N.W. 1089, 1090
(1914) (holding that negotiations and preparations of the parties, among other
extrinsic evidence, showed the correct location of land ambiguously described in a
deed).
49. See Simms v. William Simms Hardware, 216 Minn. 283, 291, 12 N.W.2d
783, 787 (1943) (citing Sandretto); Bruns v. Willems, 142 Minn. 473, 479, 172 N.W.
19991 1551
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Such extrinsic evidence serves to clarify and define the easement, filling in
50
gaps left by the indefinite grant.
Many ambiguities, however, cannot be resolved by examining the in-
51
tent of the original parties. In many cases, the original parties did not52
consider the matter causing the uncertainty. No agreement can elimi-
nate every uncertainty because the parties cannot afford to negotiate every
53
detail or possible contingency of the transaction.
In such cases, Minnesota courts interpret the indefinite terms ac-
cording to the rule of "reasonable use."5 Under this well-established
772, 774 (1919) (holding that evidence of grantee's improvements to right-of-way
easement was admissible to show "how the parties construed the ambiguity of the
description in the deed.., by ever since using and working the road upon the ex-
act place where it now is and where it is claimed defendant trespassed"); Kretz, 127
Minn. at 311, 149 N.W. at 651 (holding that "the conduct of later owners, includ-
ing plaintiff" confirmed that an easement benefiting one named lot was also in-
tended to benefit two other lots).
50. See Kretz, 127 Minn. at 311, 149 N.W. at 651 (clarifying how many lots were
served by the easement); Callen, 91 Minn. at 272, 97 N.W. at 974 (determining the
physical location of an easement whose dimensions were not described in the
grant). Because of the statute of frauds, however, courts exclude extrinsic evi-
dence for purposes of filling in or adding to a land description. See Bosold v. Ban
Con, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 724, 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating in regards to a land
description that "[e] xtrinsic evidence cannot be used to supply a missing term to a
written conveyance; it can only be used to explain an unclear term"); see also Mira-
cle Constr. Co. v. Miller, 251 Minn. 320, 324, 87 N.W.2d 665, 669 (1958); Taylor v.
Allen, 40 Minn. 433, 433-34, 42 N.W. 292, 292 (1889); MILTON R. FRIEDMAN,
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.3, at 119-21 (5th ed. 1991).
51. See 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY § 802, at
320 (BasilJones ed., 3d ed. 1939) (stating that easements sometimes contain "mat-
ters as to which, so far as appears, there was no actual intention," in which case the
court must apply supply a "presumed" or "fictitious" intention).
52. See, e.g., International Lumber Co. v. Staude, 144 Minn. 356, 359, 175
N.W. 909, 911 (1919) (noting in regards to a conveyance that "a situation has
arisen which was not within the contemplation of either party to the deed when it
was executed"). As one article points out, "[a] mbiguity in contractual instructions
is normally unintended, i.e., it is surprising to the parties involved." Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 72 CAL. L. REV. 261, 269 (1985).
53. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 92-93 (1989) (noting that incomplete-
ness in contracts often results because "the transaction costs of explicitly contract-
ing for a given contingency are greater than the benefits"); see also Hartung v.
Billmeier, 243 Minn. 148, 150, 66 N.W.2d 784, 787-88 (1954) (stating that "any of-
fer or agreement is indefinite and uncertain in some degree since words are but
imperfect symbols of what each party understands and intends").
54. See Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 426, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937) (stat-
ing that indefinite rights of way are bounded "by the line of reasonable enjoy-
ment").
1552 [Vol. 25
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55
principle, the extent of the easement is that "reasonably necessary to the
56
full enjoyment" of the use intended by the parties. The courts assume
that "the grantor intended to permit a use of the easement which was rea-
sonable under the circumstances and the grantee exyected to enjoy the
use to the fullest extent consistent with its purpose." The parties' rights
balance each other, being "so limited, each % the other, that there may
be a due and reasonable enjoyment of both. An easement, therefore,
contains only the right to a "reasonable and usual" enjoyment of its
59
terms.
The reasonable use principle serves as a gap-filler, giving content to
indefinite terms that cannot be clarified by the parties' intention.6 As
such, it allows the court to supply terms whose absence would otherwise
61
cause the easement to fail because of uncertainty.
55. See BRUcE & ELY, supra note 14, 1 8.02 [1] [a], at 8-6; 2 THOMPSON, supra
note 15, § 386, at 559; F. T. Chen, Annotation, Extent and Reasonableness of Use of
Private Way in Exercise of Easement Granted in General Terms, 3 A.L.R.3D 1256, 1260
(1965) (noting that "reasonableness of use is the operational test" in defining the
legitimate mode of use on general rights of way); W. W. Allen, Annotation, Width
of Way Created by Express Grant, Reservation, or Exception not Specifying Width, 28
A.L.R.2D 253, 255-56 (1953) (stating that courts generally define an unspecified
width in a right of way as a "reasonable" one in view of the purpose of the grant).
56. Giles v. Luker, 215 Minn. 256, 260, 9 N.W.2d 716, 718 (1943); see also
Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 424, 80 N.W. 360, 361 (1899) (stating that a
grant to cross land near or upon a boundary line "necessarily implies the right to
use a strip of land of the width reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the uses
for which the grant was made").
57. Fames v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 226, 161 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1968); see also
Bruns v. Willems, 142 Minn. 473, 479, 172 N.W. 772, 774 (1919) ("The interests of
both the servient and dominant estate must be considered in the use made of an
easement.").
58. Giles, 215 Minn. at 260, 9 N.W.2d at 718 (quoting Minto v. Salem, L. & P.
Co., 250 P. 722, 725 (1926)).
59. Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 257, 177 N.W.2d 786,
789 (1970).
60. Regarding gap-fillers and implied terms, see 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note
35, § 7.16, at 331-38. Farnsworth notes that courts formulate implied terms based
on considerations about the presumed expectations of the parties and basic no-
tions ofjustice. See id. at 334-36. Both considerations underlie the reasonable use
principle.
61. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY § 8.9, at 458 (2d
ed. 1993) (noting that "many decisions hold that, rather than for the grant to fail,
a [right of] way that is reasonable and convenient for both parties is implied"). An
early Minnesota decision explicitly dismissed the argument that omission of the
width of an easement rendered the grant void. See Lidgerding, 77 Minn. at 424, 80
N.W. at 361. The Lidgerding court used the reasonable use principle to supply the
missing term, holding that the grant "necessarily implies the right to use a strip of
land of the width reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the uses for which the
grant was made." Id.
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In applying these principles, the courts adopt a special approach
when dealing with secondary or "ancillary" easements. Secondary ease-
61
ments are rights "necessary to the enjoyment" of the primary easement,
and include the right to access, maintain and repair the primary ease-63
ment. One common secondary easement is the right of utility compa-
nies to trim trees that impinge on telephone or electric lines. Though
grants often mention these secondary easements, courts in any case will
imply them into the grant on grounds that "a grant carries with it all
things, as included in it, without which the thing granted cannot be en-
joyed." 65 Because of their derivative purpose-to support effective use of
the main easement-secondary easements are often intended to remain
66flexible. As a result, Minnesota courts have made little attempt to de-
67scribe their specific boundaries and dimensions. Instead, the courts im-
pose the reasonable use principle upon such easements, requiring that
they be exercised with due regard for the servient owner's rights and
62. St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 41 Minn. 270,
275, 43 N.W. 56, 57-58 (1889).
63. See Reed v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 100 Minn. 167, 172-73, 110 N.W.
1119, 1121 (1907) (holding that owner of a drainage easement could clean out
obstructions placed in the ditch where it crossed another's land downstream); see
also Bruns v. Willems, 142 Minn. 473, 479, 172 N.W. 772, 774 (1919). For a gen-
eral discussion of the scope of secondary easements, see BRUcE & ELY, supra note
14, 1 8.0712], at 8-54-8-56.
64. See St. Paul Realty & Assets Co. v. Tristate Tel. & Tel. Co., 122 Minn. 424,
425-26, 142 N.W. 807, 807-08 (1913). One such easement authorized the power
company "to enter upon" the grantor's land "to cut and trim trees to the extent
necessary or advisable" to construct, repair and maintain electric lines. Daly v.
Duwane Constr. Co., 259 Minn. 155, 159-60, 106 N.W.2d 631, 634 (1960).
Minnesota Statutes section 222.37 now subjects utility tree-trimming to
regulation by local ordinance. See MINN. STAT. § 222.37, subd. 1 (1998); see also
Miller-Lagro v. Northern States Power Co., 582 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 1998)
(deciding on grounds of local ordinance rather than common-law principles
whether power company exceeded its rights in trimming trees).
65. St. Anthony Falls Water-Power, 41 Minn. at 274, 43 N.W. at 57. This is a gen-
eral rule; one treatise has noted that "conveyances of a primary easement are con-
strued also to convey those so-called secondary easements needed for the full en-
joyment of the primary easement." 4 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 34.21 [2], at 188-90 (PatrickJ. Rohan ed., 1998).
66. Section 300.045 of the Minnesota Statutes, which requires utilities to give
the grantor a specific description of their easements, makes an exception for
.temporary easements for construction." MNN. STAT. § 300.045(a) (1998 & Supp.
1999). The statute recognizes the flexible dimensions intended by the parties for
this type of easement. See id.
67. See St. Paul Realty, 122 Minn. at 425-26, 142 N.W. at 807-08 (failing to de-
fine area within which telephone company must stay in exercising its right to trim
impinging trees); Reed, 100 Minn. at 172-73, 110 N.W. at 1121 (declining to specify
where easement holder could enter servient tenement in exercise of secondary
easement to repair drainage ditch).
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without causing unnecessary damage to the burdened land.68 Rather than
defining the physical borders of secondary easements, the courts insist
only that such easements be exercised reasonably.69
The ultimate effect of these interpretive principles has been to limit
the scope of written easement grants. Indefinite grants often seem to
convey expansive, unrestricted easements. By omitting the easement's
key physical dimensions, such grants appear to leave such dimensions un-
trammeled by limitations. 7 ' The rules of interpretation, however, assume
that indefinite grants are imperfectly described grants, not unlimited
72
grants. The courts recognize unrestricted easements only when ex-
pressed in explicit and specific language.
B. Interpretation of Indefinite Rights of Way
Minnesota courts have often applied the above-stated principles
when interpreting express rights of way. A right of way is an easement
that gives the owner the privilege of passing over another's land.73 A right
68. See Bruns, 142 Minn. at 479, 172 N.W. at 774-75 (stating that secondary
easement to repair road must involve a "proper improvement" made without caus-
ing "unnecessary injury or damage" to the servient owner or his land); St. Paul Re-
alty, 122 Minn. at 425-26, 142 N.W. at 807-08 (holding that telephone company
must, "if practically possible," trim branches "in such manner as not to injure the
trees," exercising due regard to the servient owners' property rights); Reed, 100
Minn. at 172-73, 110 N.W. at 1121 (holding that secondary easement to clean out
drainage ditch must be "exercised in such a manner as to cause no unnecessary
damage to the owner of the land below"). One commentator has noted:
When details about "secondary easements" are not spelled out, the gen-
eral principle is that "reasonable" uses are intended. What is reasonable
depends upon the surrounding circumstances, most importantly, in the
case of an easement appurtenant, the activities that one might be ex-
pected to conduct on the dominant tenement.
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 61, § 8.9, at 458.
69. Minnesota's application of the reasonable use principle to secondary
easements conforms to the general rule for interpreting such easements. See
BRUCE & ELY, supra note 14, 1 8.07[2], at 8-55 (stating that "[t] he easement holder
•.. must make reasonable use of the right to enter and maintain an easement and
is not permitted to unreasonably increase the burden on the servient tenement").
70. See, e.g., Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 270, 97 N.W. 973, 973 (1904) (in-
volving grant "to pass over the described premises at all times with farming im-
plements" that places no restrictions on the location, width or direction of the
easement).
71. See id.
72. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
73. See 2 JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER'S LAw DICTIONARY 3444 (Francis Rawle ed.,
3d rev. ed. 1914); see also Bosell v. Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 418, 33 N.W.2d 40,
43 (1948). The passage may occur by foot, vehicle or animals. See Cater v. North-
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of way grant is indefinite if it fails to specify the location or dimensions of
the way, or the extent of permissible use thereon.75 In such cases, the
courts 7generally have sought to circumscribe and limit the extent of the
grant.
The most common problem involves rights of way that are indefinite
as to location.7 To be valid, an easement need only describe the affected78
property and the intention of the parties. As a result, many easement
grants contain inadequate descriptions of the physical dimensions of the
servitude. 79 In some cases, the instrument locates the pathway using im-
80
precise or equivocal language . In other cases, the grant entirely omits
description of the pathway and simply describes the servient tenement.8'
82
The latter grants are known as blanket or floating easement grants.
Blanket rights of way pose special interpretive problems. Because
such grants describe the entire servient tenement, they appear to convey
western Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 543, 63 N.W. 111, 112 (1895).
74. See generally 2 THOMPSON, supra note 15, §§ 387-88, at 567-86 (discussing
rules for defining easements when location and width remain unclear).
75. See generally 2 THOMPSON, supra note 15, § 385, at 552-56 (compiling the
principles used for clarifying the extent of permissible use when the right of way
grant is unclear).
76. See infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text.
77. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Location of Easement of Way
Created by Grant Which Does Not Specify Location, 24 A.L.R.4TH 1053 (1983) (discuss-
ing principles used in various jurisdictions to locate indefinite rights of way).
78. See Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 427, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937) (stat-
ing that "[iun describing an easement, all that is required is a description which
identifies the land which is subject of the easement, and expresses the intention of
the parties"); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 14, 7.0212], at 7-2.
79. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 14, 7.02 [2], at 7-3.
80. See, e.g., Ingelson, 199 Minn. at 425, 272 N.W. at 273; Lidgerding v.
Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 423, 80 N.W. 360, 361 (1899) (involving a right of way de-
scribed as "upon or near" a specified boundary line).
81. See, e.g., Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 270, 97 N.W. 973, 973 (1904) (in-
volving grant "to pass over the described premises at all times with farming im-
plements"). This sort of indefinite grant must be distinguished from a grant that
reserves the right of designation to one of the parties. See Larson v. Amundson,
414 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). The latter type of grant is "not an
indefinite grant per se," but simply an instrument "specifically retaining and re-
serving the right to locate the easement in the future." Id.
82. See generally Barbara N. Lawrence, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Ease-
ments Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37 OKLA. L.
REV. 180, 180-81 (1984) (discussing the prevalence, interpretation and signifi-
cance of blanket pipeline easement grants). One court has defined a blanket
easement as a grant "that fails to define or specify either the location, width,
length or other dimensions of the actual strip(s) of property to be (or actually)
utilized." TCI of North Dakota, Inc. v. Schriock Holding Co., 11 F.3d 812, 816
(8th Cir. 1993).
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83 84
the right of cross over every part of the land. Minnesota courts, like85 ..
those of most other states, have uniformly rejected this interpretation of
blanket rights of way.
Minnesota courts construe blanket rights of way based on three prin-
ciples that first appeared in the 1904 case Callen v. Hause.86 The Callen
case involved a grant that simply conveyed the right to "pass over" a de-
scribed plot of land.8 In construing this instrument, the court assumed
first that the grant described only the servient tenement and not the ease-
ment.8 The physical dimensions of the easement, it presumed, remained89
entirely undefined by the grant. Second, the Callen court held that the
blanket grant was inherently indefinite and ambiguous, permitting con-
sideration of extrinsic evidence to determine the easement's location and
dimensions.9° Third, the court held that the easement itself consisted of
onefixed way within the property description in the grant.91
83. See, e.g., Callen, 91 Minn. at 270, 97 N.W. at 973 (involving grant of "the
right of way to said Reid and assigns for teams and cattle to pass over the described
premises at all times with farming implements," thus appearing to permit crossing
the land at any and every location). The term "right of way" does not designate
the physical path but rather the legal privilege, and does not itself limit a grant to
one way. See 2 BOUVIER, supra note 73, at 3444.
84. See Callen, 91 Minn. at 271-72, 97 N.W. at 974 (holding by implication that
a right of way to pass over a defined tract granted only one, fixed, "reasonably suit-
able" pathway over the land); see also Ingelson, 199 Minn. at 428, 272 N.W. at 274
("When the right of way is not bounded in the grant, the law bounds it by the line
of reasonable enjoyment.").
85. See THOMPSON, supra note 15, § 386, at 563 (noting the general rule that a
blanket right of way "does not operate to give a right-of-way over the entire tract
described, but merely a right to use a convenient way over such tract sufficient for
the purposes intended by the grant").
86. 91 Minn. 270, 97 N.W. 973 (1904).
87. See id. at 270, 97 N.W. at 973.
88. See id. at 270-71, 97 N.W. at 973 (holding that the right of way needed to
be "laid off" or "designated" within the tract); see also BRUCE & ELY, supra note 14, 1
7.02[5], at 7-14-7-15 (noting that some grants describe tracts of such size as to cre-
ate uncertainty whether they designate the easement or the land within which the
easement lays).
89. See Callen, 91 Minn. at 271, 97 N.W. at 974 (holding that blanket right of
way did not designate the location of the easement). Regarding this point, an ear-
lier New York decision explained that a blanket right of way does not give "the
right to pass over every part" of the described property, but only such right as is
"necessary in order to pass and repass in the usual way, and with the usual means."
Grafton v. Moir, 29 N.E. 974, 976 (N.Y. 1892).
90. See Callen, 91 Minn. at 272, 97 N.W. at 974 (holding that blanket easement
was "not fully clear and unambiguous," necessitating consideration of extrinsic
evidence).
91. See id. at 270, 97 N.W. at 973 (holding blanket easement of way limited the
grantee to one way, which needed to be "laid off or designated"); see also Hedderly
v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 443, 447, 44 N.W. 527, 528 (1890) (stating that the courts
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Once the court determines that the location of the right of way is in-
definite, it looks at extrinsic evidence to determine its placement. If a
way existed at the time of the grant, the court will treat this location as the
way unless the grant states otherwise.93 If a way did not exist already, the
court looks at the practical construction of the grant by the parties. The
grantor possesses the right to choose the location, but if he fails the
grantee may choose the way.9"
In any case, the location must conform to the rule of reasonable
use.9 6 As one decision announced, if "the right of way is not bounded in
the grant, the law bounds it by the line of reasonable enjoyment. "9 7 It
must be "a convenient and suitable way" that does not "unreasonably in-
terfere with the rights of the owner of the servient estate."9s Once a route
has been designated, followed by long acquiescence in its use, the route
may not be relocated without the consent of both parties.99
Another uncertainty affecting rights of way is indefiniteness as to
width. 100 Only one Minnesota case, Lidgerding v. Zignego,101 has dealt with
construe a grant to give a definite location to the easement, unless the language of
the easement indicates otherwise); 2 THOMPSON, supra note 15, § 384, at 550-51
("A private way is the right of one man to travel over the land of another by some
particular route or line.").
92. See Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 428, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937); Cal-
len, 91 Minn. at 271, 97 N.W. at 974; Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 424, 80
N.W. 360, 361 (1899).
93. See Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 215, 101 N.W.2d 213, 222 (1960).
94. See Ingelson, 199 Minn. at 428, 272 N.W. at 274; Callen, 91 Minn. at 271, 97
N.W. at 974.
95. See Ingelson, 199 Minn. at 428, 272 N.W. at 274.
96. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
97. Ingelson, 199 Minn. at 428, 272 N.W. at 274 (quoting Grafton v. Moir, 29
N.E. 974, 976 (N.Y. 1892)).
98. Id.
99. See Sabin v. Rea, 176 Minn. 264, 265, 223 N.W. 151, 151 (1929); see also St.
Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co. v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., 44 Minn. 325,
335, 46 N.W. 566, 569 (1890) (stating in dicta that "when a right of way is once lo-
cated and occupied it is fixed forever"). Drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Prop-
erty have proposed changing this rule to permit unilateral relocation of an ease-
ment by the servient owner under certain circumstances. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 4.8 & cmt. f (Tentative Draft no. 4, 1994). For
analysis of the implications of this change, see The Right of Owners of Servient Estates
to Relocate Easements Unilaterally, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1693 (1996) (criticizing the
proposed change); Douglas B. Harris, Balancing the Equities: Is Missouri Adopting a
Progressive Rule for Relocation of Easements?, 61 Mo. L. REv. 1039 (1996) (welcoming
the proposed alteration).
100. See generally Allen, supra note 55 (discussing the general rules for deter-
mining the width of a way when undefined in the grant).
101. 77 Minn. 421, 80 N.W. 360 (1899).
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this problem. 1°2 In Lidgerding, a "right of way to cross on foot or with
teams" made no mention of passageway's width. 03 Refusing to void the
grant for uncertainty, the court filled in the omission using the reasonable
use principle. The grant, it held, "necessarily implies the right to use a
strip of land of the width reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the
uses for which the grant was made." A similar rule for defining an un-
certain width is used in at least twenty-one other jurisdictions.
A third problem involves indefiniteness as to the burden of use on
the way. 16 In resolving this issue, Minnesota courts have relied primarily
on the reasonable use rule rather than extrinsic circumstances. The lead-
ing case in this area, Giles v. Luker,"7 held that a grantee may use the
easement in any manner "reasonably necessary to the full enjoyment" of
his grant, so long as he does not infringe the reasonable rights of the ser-108
vient owner. On this ground, the Giles court permitted gravel trucks to
use an unrestricted way only during daylight hours at reasonable speeds. 1°9
Another decision used the reasonable use principle to set the height of an
alley at that point which would reasonably serve both dominant and servi-
ent owners. Courts have cited the principle to permit reasonable use of
a right of way by the servient owner, as for instance by constructing a
102. Search of Westlaw database MN-CS using the following terms-and-
connectors query: EASEMENT & WIDTH /P (INDEFINITE UNDEFINED
INDETERMINATE VAGUE UNSPECIFIED IMPRECISE AMBIGUOUS UNCLEAR
UNCERTAIN) (Apr. 3,1999).
103. Lidgerding, 77 Minn. at 425, 80 N.W. at 361.
104. Id. at 424, 80 N.W. at 361.
105. See Allen, supra note 55, at 255-56 & Later Case Service at 30-31 (noting
that the following states interpret an undefined width as a "reasonable" or "con-
venient" one: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, NewJersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Vir-
ginia).
106. See generally Chen, supra note 55 (discussing the standard principles used
to determine the permissible burden of use on rights of way where the grant does
not specify the extent of use).
107. 215 Minn. 256, 9 N.W.2d 716 (1943). In this case, the holder of a general
right of way began using it to haul gravel in large trucks, which created dust and
noise that interfered with the servient owner's summer resort business. See id. at
257-60, 9 N.W.2d at 717-18.
108. Id. at 260, 9 N.W.2d at 718.
109. See id. The court not only limited the time and speed of the trucks, but
also instructed the lower court to order the easement holder to spray the road
next to the servient owner's cottages "to minimize the dust created by [the] haul-
age." Id. at 261, 9 N.W.2d at 718.
110. See Kretz v. Fireproof Storage Co., 127 Minn. 304, 149 N.W. 648 (1914)
(holding that a right of way must be kept "at a level reasonably calculated" to serve
both the servient and the dominant tenement owners).
111. See Thompson v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 89, 91-92, 106, N.W.
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walkway over the right of way." 2 The principle also underlies the ease-
ment holder's ri ht to use new, improved technology in exercising the
right of passage.
The courts' interpretation of indefinite rights of way, therefore,
works to pin down and restrict the grant. An indefinite right of way is re-
stricted to one stationary and reasonable location, which cannot be moved
without the consent of both parties.1 4 The courts circumscribe its width
and burden of use to reasonable proportions based on the easement's
purpose and the respective rights of the parties.1 Strictly speaking, the
courts do not abridge or decrease the easement; rather they define its true
boundaries and thereby limit its possible extent.1 1 6  The courts simply
supply "definiteness and precision" to the easement, preventing it from
becoming an "onerous" burden on the servient tenement.
C. Interpretation of Indefinite Utility Easements
118
Utility easements are a type of right of way. The right of passage
consists of the privilege of sending gas, electricity, telephone transmissions
and the like across and through the servient tenement."9 The main dis-
tinction from ordinary rights of way is that utility ways require continual
occupation of the easement by immovable lines, poles, pipes and similar
102, 103 (1906); Giles, 215 Minn. at 260, 9 N.W.2d at 718.
112. See Minneapolis Athletic Club v. Cohler, 287 Minn. 254, 258-59, 177
N.W.2d 786, 789-90 (1970).
113. See Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543, 546-
47 (Minn. 1983); Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 543, 63 N.W.
111,112 (1895).
114. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 100-113 and accompanying text.
116. The courts describe this limitation process as "ascertainment," "designa-
tion," "determination" or "definition" of the easement. See, e.g., Ingelson v. Olson,
199 Minn. 422, 428-29, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937); Sabin v. Rea, 176 Minn. 264,
265-266, 223 N.W. 151, 151-52 (1929); Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 271-72, 97
N.W. 973, 974 (1904).
117. See Hedderly v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 443, 446, 44 N.W. 527, 528 (1890)
(construing an easement grant to refer to an existing railroad line rather than a
future line because the latter interpretation would transform the easement into "a
float" that "would be more onerous to the grantee than a definitely located ease-
ment").
118. Utility easement grants often describe the servitude as a "right of way."
See, e.g., Winslow v. City of Vallejo, 84 P. 191, 191 (Cal. 1906); Flynn v. Michigan-
Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 161 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa 1968); Strauch v. Coastal States
Crude Gathering Co., 424 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. App. 1968).
119. See Cater v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 544, 63 N.W. 111,
113 (1895) (holding that a highway right of way includes within it "the transporta-
tion of persons and property, or the transmission of intelligence").
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120
support structures. 121
Utility easements frequently take the form of blanket grants, where
the conveyance describes the servient land and the purpose of the ease-
ment, but not its specific location or dimensions. Before Scherger v. North-
ern Natural Gas Co.,'22 described herein, no Minnesota court had ruled on
the extent of blanket utility grants.
Minnesota has enacted legislation to address blanket utility grants,125
however. Minnesota Statutes section 300.045, originally enacted in
1973, provided that all public service corporations, including pipeline
companies, must "definitely and specifically" describe any easements ac-
quired over private property.114 The second part of the statute, added in
1993 and recently recodified as subsection (c), stated that:
When a question arises as to the location of an easement across
specific property and the recorded description does not include
a definite and specific description of the easement... , the pub-
lic service corporation holding the easement shall, upon written
request by the specific property owner, produce and record in a
timely manner a definite and specific description [of the ease-
m ent] .125
Although pipeline companies are not public service corporations, the
Minnesota Attorney General has determined that they nevertheless fall
120. See id. at 545-46, 63 N.W. at 113 (noting telegraph, telephone, railroad
and trolley easements require immovable fixtures). Utility easements also differ
from ordinary easements because they can be created by condemnation. See MINN.
STAT. § 222.36 (1998).
121. See Lawrence, supra note 82, at 181.
122. 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998).
123. See MuNN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (a)
(Supp. 1999)).
124. See MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MINN. STAT. § 300.045(a)
(Supp. 1999)).
125. MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998). The statute was amended in 1999 by the
legislature in response to the Scherger decision. See infra note 247 and accompany-
ing text. The amended and recodified subsection now provides:
When a question arises as to the location, width, or course of an easement
across specific property and the recorded description does not include a
definite and specific description of the location, width, or course of the
easement... , the public service corporation holding the easement shall,
upon written request by the specific property owner, produce and record
in a timely manner an instrument that provides a definite and specific de-
scription [of the easement].
MINN. STAT. § 300.045(c) (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added to indicate new lan-
guage).
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within the meaning of this statute.126
Section 300.045 suggests that blanket utility grants remain subject to
the rules governing indefinite rights of way. First, it implicitly assumes
that blanket utility grants are indefinite. According to the statute, the
easement is not defined by the property description but rather consists of
a "specific" area within the "corners" of such property description. Sec-
ond, the statute implies that the "real" easement consists of one fixed lo-
cation, because it must be capable of "definite and specific" description. 128
Third, the statute effectively limits the "real" easement to the area sur-
rounding the utility fixtures (pipe, poles, lines), since no utility would
provide a specific description that failed to include its transmission fix-
tures.'2 The statute, in short, treats blanket utility easements like ordinary
rights of way, viewing them as grants of a single, immovable corridor cen-
tering on the utility's fixtures.
Other states have taken a similar view of blanket utility easements,
appling the general principles used in construction of indefinite rights of
way. The decisions depend heavily on the exact language used in the
grant. They also differ in how they resolve questions about the burden
of such easements, such as the permissible number or size of buried
pipes. Nevertheless, several principles consistently appear.
126. See 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 131 (1974).
127. See M1NN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MINN. STAT. § 300.045(b)
(Supp. 1999)). The statute states that the public service corporation must provide
a "definite and specific description" by giving either (a) "specific legal reference
points as to the location of the easement in relation to the corners of the specific
property" or (b) a drawing that locates the easement "in relation to the corners of
the specific property involved." Id.
128. See id. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MiNN. STAT. § 300.045(b) (2)
(Supp. 1999)) (stating that the "definite and specific description" of the easement
must show the points where the easement "enters and departs from the prop-
erty").
129. If the transmission fixtures lay outside the "definite and specific descrip-
tion," the utility would be subject to an action for trespass. See Northern States
Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 396-97, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30 (1963).
130. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 14, 1 7.02[5], at 7-14-7-16; Lawrence, supra
note 82, at 186-88.
131. See Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 270, 97 N.W. 973, 973 (1904); Lidg-
erding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 423, 80 N.W. 360, 361 (1899); see also supra notes
86-113 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 314 S.W.2d 193, 195
(Ky. 1958) (emphasizing the grant's specific language that additional pipes need
not be parallel to the original pipes); Boland v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Amer-
ica, 816 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Tex. App. 1991, no writ) (stressing the instrument's spe-
cific grant to the pipeline utility of the right to choose the "route or routes" of the
pipes).
133. Compare Winslow v. City of Vallejo, 84 P. 191, 191-92 (Cal. 1906) (holding
that a right of way to lay "any water pipes or mains" was fixed by grantee's use to
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First, the decisions largely agree that a blanket utility grant is indefi-
nite as to its physical dimensions and therefore subject to restriction.134
Only when the language of the grant clearly burdens the entire servient
tenement do the courts treat the easement as an unrestricted servitude.
35
Second, the course or location of the "real" easement is fixed by the loca-
tion of the utility's lines (pipe, wire, etc.).s 6 When the utility lays its pipe
(or hangs its wires), it effectively designates the location of the actual
easement, which becomes limited to this path. 13 Third, the width of the
easement is the line of reasonable enjoyment necessary to fulfill the pur-
poses of the grant.13s
Blanket utility easements, in short, are governed by the same restric-
one pipe of same size as originally laid), with Knox v. Pioneer Natural Gas Co., 321
S.W.2d 596, 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding that easement to
lay gas pipeline was not limited to the pipe size originally installed by the grantee),
and Kleinheider v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 528 F.2d 837, 841-42 (8th Cir. 1975)
(holding that easement to lay and maintain "a pipe line or pipe lines" was not lim-
ited to the number of pipelines originally laid). For criticism of the doctrine in
Winslow, see Notes and Recent Decisions, Easements: Effect of User in Determining Ex-
tent of Grant Made in General Terms, 31 CAL. L. REv. 442 (1943).
134. See, e.g., Capital Elec. Power Ass'n v. Hinson, 84 So. 2d 409, 412 (Miss.
1956) (holding that a right of way easement containing "general terms as to loca-
tion, length, or terminal points" is "uncertain and ambiguous"). But see Boland,
816 S.W.2d at 844-45 (holding that easement permitting pipelines "at route or
routes" selected by grantee was not ambiguous and essentially covered the entire
servient tenement).
135. See, e.g., Sorrell, 314 S.W.2d at 194-95 (holding that pipeline grant permit-
ting construction of "additional lines not necessarily parallel to any existing line"
created a vested, expansible easement that permitted "additional lines to be laid
across any portion of the land"); Boland, 816 S.W.2d at 844 (stressing the instru-
ment's specific grant to the pipeline utility of the right to choose the "route or
routes" of the pipes).
136. See, e.g., Hinson, 84 So. 2d at 413 (holding that electric company's place-
ment of its lines "fixes" its right and "limits it to the particular course or manner in
which it has been enjoyed"); Hamilton v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.,
110 So. 2d 612, 614 (Miss. 1959); Mielke v. Yellowstone Pipeline Co., 870 P.2d
1005, 1006 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that location of pipeline, unspecified
in grant, was fixed by installation of original pipeline).
137. See 2 THOMPSON, supra note 15, § 385, at 556 ("If the grant of an easement
is in general terms the exercise of the right fixes it and limits its exercise. The
grantee cannot later extend the enjoyment of the easement.").
138. See, e.g., Lone Star Gas Co. v. Childress, 187 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945) (holding that the width of a blanket pipeline easement is that "rea-
sonably needed" to attain the purposes of the grant); Mielke, 870 P.2d at 1006
(holding that width of pipeline easement, unspecified in grant, is "bounded by the
line of reasonable enjoyment"). See also Flynn v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co.,
161 N.W.2d 56, 61-62 (Iowa 1968) (stating that a court should not define the spe-
cific width of a pipeline easement in a declaratory judgment, but should rather
determine the permissible width in specific fact situations according to the rule
that the width is that "reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the easement").
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tive principles affecting indefinite rights of way. Unless the granting lan-
guage indicates otherwise, both Minnesota statute and case law from other
jurisdictions confine these grants to one corridor of reasonable width for
achieving the purposes of the grant.
The general effect of Minnesota's easement interpretation has been
the prevention of heavy, unintentional burdens on property. 1 9  The
courts refuse to extend easements "by legal construction beyond the ob-• 140
jects originally contemplated or expressly agreed upon by the parties.
Faced with indefinite easements, the courts have sought to define and
limit their dimensions and permissible uses. They have refused to find
unrestricted easements unless the original parties showed a clear inten-
tion to create them.14 1 The cases described next, however, dramatically
departed from these policies.
III. THE CASES
A. Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co.1 43
This case involved a written easement instrument for an under-
ground gas pipeline on land leased and farmed by Bergh and Misson
Farms, Inc. ("B & M").'4 The landowners, Arlo and Dorothy Bergh,
granted the easement using a pre-printed form supplied by the grantee,• .. 145 
Great Lakes Gas Transmission Co. ("Great Lakes") The instrument
granted Great Lakes a 125-foot corridor that ran diagonally through the
146 9land for about 2,400 feet. Great Lakes obtained the right to construct,
139. See, e.g., Hedderly v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 443, 447, 44 N.W. 527, 528 (1890)
(stating that the court will avoid treating an easement as a "float" that the domi-
nant owner can locate at will because such interpretation would place an "oner-
ous" burden on the servient owner).
140. Thompson v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 89, 92, 106 N.W. 102, 104
(1906).
141. See Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 256 N.W.2d 271,
278 (Minn. 1977).
142. See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 579 (Minn.
1998); Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co., 565 N.W.2d
23, 24 (Minn. 1997).
143. 565 N.W.2d 23 (Minn. 1997).
144. See id. at 24-25. Bergh and Misson Farms was a corporation owned by the
daughter of the landowners and her husband. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix
at 2, Bergh & Misson Farms (No. C8-96-603).
145. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at A-i and A-2, Bergh & Misson Farms
(No. C8-96-603) (being a copy of the right of way agreement).
146. See Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25. The 1970 agreement was a
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147
maintain, repair and replace the pipeline at any time. In addition, it
received "the right of ingress and egress to and from said right-of-way...
until said easement is exercised and so long as the same is used for any of. 148
the purposes granted herein." The grant permitted Great Lakes to
"temporarily use work space as needed" for constructing, maintaining and
removing the pipeline, and Great Lakes agreed to pay for any resulting
"damages to crops, timber, livestock and improvements."
149
The key issue involved the meaning and extent of the ingress/egress
clause. Injune of 1994, Great Lakes determined that a section of the pipe
required recoating. 15 Without consulting B & M, Great Lakes created a
pathway to the worksite.15 For the next six weeks, it drove heavy equip-152
ment in and out to perform the repair. During this time, twelve to fif-
teen inches of rain fell. 5 3 Great Lakes' repair activities rutted the land,
clogged the drainage system, and exacerbated floodint of the fields.lM B
& M's sugar beet crop sustained considerable damage.
B & M sued Great Lakes for trespass on the grounds that the pipeline
company exceeded the scope of its ingress/egress easement.15 6 B & M
sought to recover triple damages for the trespass, as authorized by section
548.05 of the Minnesota Statutes. 15 7 The ingress/egress easement, it ar-
gued, needed to be exercised in a "reasonable" way, and this Great Lakes
failed to do. 15 The trial court rejected this argument, excluding evidence
blanket easement grant, but the parties redrafted the grant in 1990 to locate
easement more specifically pursuant to section 300.045 of the Minnesota Statutes.
See id.
147. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at A-1 to A-2, Bergh & Misson Farms
(No. C8-96-603).
148. Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id. Great Lakes' path of approach differed from a route, chosen with
the Berghs' input, for an earlier maintenance project. See Respondent's Brief at 3,
Bergh & Misson Farms (No. C8-96-603).
152. See Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id. The trial jury awarded over $19,000 for property damages. See id.
156. See id. at 24-25. Exceeding the scope of an easement constitutes trespass.
See Northern States Power Co. v. Franklin, 265 Minn. 391, 396, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30
(1963) (holding that maintenance of power lines that are "unauthorized by the
deed of easement" constitutes trespass unless the landowner consents).
157. See Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 24-25; MINN. STAT. § 548.05
(1998). Section 548.05 provides in part that "[w]hoever shall carry away, use or
destroy any wood, timber, lumber, hay, grass, or other personal property of an-
other person, without lawful authority, shall be liable to the owner thereof for
treble the amount of damages assessed therefor in an action to recover such dam-
ages." MINN. STAT. § 548.05 (1998).
158. See Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 26.
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regarding the reasdnableness of the use and refusing to issue a jury in-
struction on trespass. The court of appeals reversed, holding that even
unrestricted easements must be exercised in a reasonable manner and
that the jury should consider the issue.160
The supreme court agreed with the trial court. ' It held that the
terms of the easement were clear and unambiguous, despite the omission
of any information regarding the location or dimensions of in-162
gress/egress. The agreement, it stressed, identified the servient tene-
ment, the purpose for which access could be exercised, and the conse-
quences for damage resulting from such exercise.16  As such, the
agreement defined "all of Great Lakes' rights and responsibilities" in us-
ing the access easement.'6 4 The court emphasized that when the language
of the easement grant is clear and unambiguous, the court's power to de-.. .165
termine its extent is limited. On these grounds, the court argued that it
had "no occasion to read a reasonableness requirement into the easement
grant."
166
B. Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co.
167
The Schergers owned a farm in Dodge County subject to an ease-. ,, 168
ment held by Northern Natural Gas ("Northern"). The easement
agreement, executed in 1931 by the Schergers' predecessors, 169 granted
Northern "the right, privilege and easement to construct, maintain and
operate pipe lines ... over and through" the Schergers' land, with the• 170
right to replace the line. The agreement was a blanket easementgrant, 17 describing the affected property according to its legal boundaries
without specifying the actual location of the intended use.72-
Pursuant to the agreement, Northern installed a pipeline across the
159. See id.
160. See Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Gas Transmission Co., No.
C8-96-603, 1996 WL 571450, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1996).
161. See Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25.
162. See id. at 26.
163. See id. at 26-27.
164. Id. at 27.
165. See id. at 26-27 (citing Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank,
256 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (Minn. 1977)).
166. Id. at 27.
167. 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998).
168. See id. at 579.
169. See id.
170. Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 562 N.W.2d 328, 329 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997).
171. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
172. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 579.
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land in 1932, which remained undisturbed for the next sixty-three years.73
In 1995, Northern indicated to the Schergers that it intended to replace
the existing pipe with a new pipe running fifty to three hundred feet away
from the old line. 74 The Schergers demanded a "definite and specific de-
scription" of the easement pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
300.045.175 Northern indicated that the blanket grant gave it the right to
place the new pipe anywhere on the property and that it would provide
the description only after installation of the new pipe.
76
The Schergers sued a writ of mandamus to compel Northern to initi-
ate condemnation proceedings for the new pipe. The trial court
granted summary judgment for Northern on grounds that the easement
was clear and unambiguous and that it granted Northern the right to re-
place the line.' 78 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the original pipe fixed the course of the easement, and that the new line
must fall within "the line of reasonable enjoyment" of this location.
179
The supreme court reversed.18s It assumed that the property descrip-
tion in the grant described the easement and not merely the servient
tenement. It therefore held that the agreement was clear and unambigu-
ous, and thus that "the court's power to determine the extent of the
easement granted is limited.""" Interpreting the blanket grant according
to its "plain language," the court held that it authorized Northern to re-
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.; supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text (explaining the statute
and noting recent amendments to the statute).
176. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 579.
177. See id. at 580. Obtaining a writ of mandamus is the standard procedure
for asserting a claim for inverse condemnation. See Vern Reynolds Constr., Inc. v.
City of Champlin, 539 N.W.2d 614, 616-17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); see also MINN.
STAT. § 586.01 (1998). The Scherger court stressed that mandamus is "an extraor-
dinary remedy" suitable "where there exists no adequate remedy at law." Scherger,
575 N.W.2d at 579 n.1 (citing McIntosh v. Davis, 441 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn.
1989)). The court stated that the remedy was not appropriate for this case be-
cause "the essence of this action was the request for a judicial declaration as to the
scope and validity" of the 1931 easement. Id.
178. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 580.
179. Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 562 N.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997).
180. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d 578, 579 (Minn. 1998).
181. See id. at 580. The court's assumption appears in the way it framed the
issues. The main question, in its view, was not the location or boundaries of the
easement, but rather "whether Northern ... has the right under the terms of the
1931 easement agreement to replace the pipeline ... with a new pipeline, at a dif-
ferent location within the easement." Id. (emphasis added).
182. Id. (quoting Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co.,
565 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1997)).
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place pipeline anywhere within the land described in the easement. 8 3
Nothing in the literal language of the grant "limits or restricts in any way
the location within the easement of any additional or replacement pipe-
lines." 18
In addition, the court held that section 300.045 of the Minnesota
Statutes applies only to easements obtained after the statute's effective
date of 1973.185 "There is simply nothing in this statute to suggest that the
legislature intended the language to apply to easements acquired before
its enactment.'
86
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES
The Minnesota Supreme Court misinterpreted the scope of the
easements in both the Bergh & Misson Farms and Scherger cases. In each
case, the error resulted from a misapplication of basic principles of inter-
pretation, in particular the ambiguity doctrine. l 7 The court erroneously
viewed both grants as "clear and unambiguous," and therefore immune to
definition and restriction. 18 Refusing to limit the literal language of the
instruments, the court issued extreme interpretations of the grants in fa-
vor of the utilities. l s9 As a result, the property owners suffered losses and
inconveniences certainly not contemplated by the original parties to the
agreements.
A. Ambiguity in the Easements
The court's most serious error resulted from its faulty notion of am-
biguity. Both decisions assumed that ambiguity in easement grants results
from vague language in the instrument. In each case, the court sug-
gested that the central issue was whether "the language granting the easement
is clear and unambiguous."' 91 If the wording appears clear, "the court's
183. See id. at 580-81.
184. Id. at 581.
185. See id. (discussing the statute as it read prior to the 1999 amendments).
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
188. See infra Part IV.A.
189. See infra Part IV.B.
190. See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 580-81 (Minn.
1998) (focusing on the written language of the agreement in concluding that it
was "clear and unambiguous"); Bergh & Misson Farms v. Great Lakes Transmis-
sion Co., 565 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1997) (stressing that the grant's terms were
"broad" yet at the same time "clear and unambiguous").
191. Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 26; see also Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at
580 (quoting Bergh & Misson Farms).
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power to determine the extent of the easement granted is limited. " 19 2 The
court essentially equated ambiguity with linguistic uncertainty.
Under traditional principles, however, ambiguity centers on the19s
easement, not the granting language. Ambiguous grants are those that
fail to define the easement's scope, especially its physical dimensions'94
Such indefiniteness may result not only from vague granting language but
also from omissions, i.e., instances where "the parties have failed to ex-• . . 195
press themselves in writing." As a result, even clearly worded grants may
suffer from ambiguity if the extent of the easement remains unclear. In
both the Bergh & Misson Farms and Scherger cases, the court overlooked the
presence of ambiguity by omission in the grants. In both cases, the grant197
failed to "definitely designate or locate" the easement.
The ambiguity was obvious in the ingress/egress easement at issue in
the Bergh & Misson Farms case. The grant described the easement as a
"right of ingress and egress," and supplemented it with the right to "tem-
porarily use work space as needed." It also described the servient tene-
ment and the permissible purposes for access.19 Such information is the
bare minimum necessary to create a valid easement in Minnesota.2 0 The
grant completely omitted the key physical dimensions of the easement:
location, direction, termini and width.2 0 ' Nor did it indicate the burden
of use, such as the number or types of vehicles permitted under the ease-
192. Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 26; see also Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at
580. The full statement is as follows: "when the language granting the easement is
clear and unambiguous, the court's power to determine the extent of the ease-
ment granted is limited." Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 26. As authority
for this statement, the Bergh & Misson Farms court cited Highway 7 Embers, Inc. v.
Northwestern National Bank, 256 N.W.2d 271, 276-77 (Minn. 1977). However, the
Highway 7 Embers court made a different point: when the "written description" in
an easement "is capable of exact interpretation," the court may not construct "any
reasonable easement" for the parties. Highway 7Embers, 256 N.W.2d at 277.
193. See, e.g., Hedderly v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 443, 446-47, 44 N.W. 527, 528
(1890). The Hedderly court stated that easement grants possess "definiteness and
precision" when the instrument gives "means for determining when, and precisely
where, the easement was reserved." Id. (emphasis added).
194. See supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
195. Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 271, 97 N.W. 973, 974 (1904); see also Kretz
v. Fireproof Storage Co., 127 Minn. 304, 310, 149 N.W. 648, 651 (1914); supra
notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
196. SeeFarnesv. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 225-26, 161 N.W.2d 297, 300-01 (1968);
Lien v. Loraus, 403 N.W.2d 286, 288-89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); supra notes 38-43
and accompanying text.
197. Sabin v. Rea, 176 Minn. 264, 265, 223 N.W. 151, 151 (1929).
198. Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25.
199. See id.
200. See Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 427, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937).
201. See Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25.
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202
ment.
The Bergh & Misson Farms grant, in short, failed to define the central
physical features of the easement. The damage clause, so stressed by the203
court, did not clarify these dimensions in any way. It simply specified
204
the utility's liability for damage resulting from use of the easement.
Though the court recognized that the grant contained "broad terms," it
did not view such imprecision as evidence of "ambiguity."2 5 According to
traditional principles, however, such imprecision is the touchstone of am-
206
biguity and opens up the instrument to clarification and limitation.
The Scherger grant was even more ambiguous. In assessing the grant,
however, the Scherger court did not dismiss evidence of imprecision in the
grant. Rather, it failed to see the imprecision at all.
The Scherger court's errors stemmed from a basic misunderstanding
of blanket easement grants. It assumed that Northern's 9Tant described
the easement itself and not merely the servient tenement. The grant, it
held, conveyed an easement covering the entire tract in the instrument.208
Because the property description was legally accurate, the court viewed
the grant as "clear and unambiguous" and worthy of literal enforcement
according to its "plain meaning."
2
0
9
In so holding, the court completely misconstrued the "plain mean-
ing" of blanket easement grants. Like other states, Minnesota has always
treated blanket rights of way as descriptions of the servient tenement, not
210
the easement. It has assumed that the easement in such grants remains
211
undefined, existing somewhere within the described property. The
same principle applies to blanket utility grants like the Scherger convey-
ance. Minnesota Statutes section 300.045 prohibits new blanket utility
213
easements because they fail to describe and locate the easement. As the
statute recognizes, the true easement consists of a smaller pathway that
"enters and departs from the property" at specific points.
2 1 4
202. See id.
203. See id. at 26-27.
204. See id. at 26.
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
207. See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 580 (Minn.
1998) (holding that the easement consisted of the tract described by the agree-
ment).
208. See id.
209. See id. at 580-81.
210. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
211. Seeid.
212. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
213. See MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (a)
(Supp. 1999)).
214. Id. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MINN. STAT. § 300.045(b) (2) (Supp.
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Even Northern recognized this principle. Its brief to the court de-
scribed blanket grants as "undefined" easements and distinguished them
from "defined easements which describe a specific corridor running
through the property." 21  Moreover, Northern's letter to the Schergers'
counsel, cited in the brief, admitted that the easement was undefined and
that "definition of the easement" would occur at a later date.1 6
Certain types of blanket utility grants, it is true, give rights to utilize
217
the entire servient estate. No such grants have come before a Minne-
218
sota court. Courts in other jurisdictions, however, only recognize such
grants when the instrument clearly indicates or implies this intent, for ex-
ample by indicating that the utility may lay additional lines not necessarily
parallel to the existing lines.219 Northern's easement does not fall into this
class. Though the easement was expansible, permitting Northern to lay220
multiple pipes, expansible easements do not convey rights over an en-
tire servient estate.
The Scherger grant, in short, offered no physical description of the
easement. As such, it constituted an ambiguous instrument subject to
definition and limitation by the court.
B. Limitation of the Easement Grants
Because the court found no ambiguity in the grants, it refused to de-
fine or limit the easements in any way. This procedure conforms to the
1999))
215. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 3-4, Scherger (No. CX-96-2319). At
other times, Northern took care to refer to its servitude on the Scherger land as a
"defined easement." See id. at 10.
216. See id. at A-74 (containing November 3, 1995 letter from Northern's
Right-of-Way Supervisor to Schergers' counsel). The letter stated that Northern
"is willing to define the present pipe line easement across the Scherger property.
The definition of easement will be done after all construction activities are com-
plete." Id.
217. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
218. Before the Scherger case, Minnesota courts had not considered the scope
of any blanket utility grant, much less a blanket utility grant that conveyed rights to
utilize the entire servient tenement. See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 562
N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998) (not-
ing that the issue of replacing a pipeline under a blanket utility grant was "an issue
of first impression in Minnesota," and utilizing case law from other jurisdictions to
decide the case).
219. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
220. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 580 (stating that the agreement allowed North-
ern to "construct, maintain, and operate pipelines").
221. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
222. See Bergh & Misson Farms, Inc. v. Great Lakes Transmission Co., 565
N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1997).
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traditional principle that clear and unambiguous grants should be en-
forced literally. In the present cases, however, this procedure trans-
formed broad imprecise language into unrestricted language. The Bergh
& Misson Farms decision essentially gave Great Lakes the right to access its
pipeline in an unreasonable manner-without regard to any property right
possessed by the Berghs-so long as it pays market compensation. The
Scherger holding granted Northern the right to lay any quantity of pipes, in
any direction, over every inch of the Scherger farm. By failing to restrict
the grant, the court gave the utilities a windfall of rights over the servient
tenements.
The correct approach was to restrict the grants by defining the actual
limits of the easements. As an early decision stated, the rights conveyed by
an instrument are "for the court to ascertain" when the instrument omits
"apt words ... expressing and defining these rights."22 4 Minnesota courts
have looked at two basic things to clarify imprecise easements: extrinsic
evidence and the reasonable use rule. Application of these rules would
have produced a more rational construction of the grants.
The court should have restricted the Bergh & Misson Farms grant ac-
225
cording to the reasonable use principle. As a secondary easement, the
ingress/egress easement need not have been limited to a single immov-
able path (the usual rule for right of way easements). 226 The granting lan-
227
guage, in fact, suggests that the parties intended flexible access rights.
The grant included rights to use "temporary construction space as needed,"
a very elastic specification. Also, the damage clause, requiring auto-
matic payment for injuries to the land, suiests that the parties foresaw
and prepared for flexible emergency access.
223. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
224. Callen v. Hause, 91 Minn. 270, 271, 97 N.W. 973, 974 (1904).
225. See BRucE & ELY, supra note 14, 1 7.02 [1], at 7-3 (describing unrestricted
easements of this sort as indefinite and yet subject to the reasonable use princi-
ple).
226. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text. Minnesota Statutes section
300.045 specifically exempts "temporary easements for construction" from its re-
quirement that utility easements be capable of "specific and definite description."
MrNN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MINN. STAT. § 300.045(a) (Supp.
1999)).
227. See Bergh & Misson Farms, 565 N.W.2d at 25 (quoting the language of the
easement).
228. Id. (emphasis added).
229. See id. at 26-27. The brief of amicus curiae Northern Natural Gas Company
emphasized that pipeline companies draw up broad ingress/egress easements to
prepare for emergency access:
The right of ingress and egress... is crucial to the safe operation and
maintenance of any utility, and particularly a natural gas pipeline. If an
emergency occurs, the most expedient access to the pipeline may be
[Vol. 251572
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Though flexible, the Bergh & Misson Farms easement remained sub-
230
ject to the reasonable use principle. Minnesota case law requires that
secondary easements be used without causing "unnecessary injury or dam-
age" to the servient tenement.23 Like all easements, the ingress/egress
easement existed only for reasonable uses and could not be exercised in232
an "absolute, irrelative, and uncontrolled" manner. Though the ease-
ment was not "bounded by the grant," the law "bounds it by the line of
reasonable enjoyment."
2 3 3
The court should have restricted the Scherger grant according to the
traditional rules for locating indefinite rights of way. Other jurisdictions• . . 235 ..
have applied these rules to blanket utility grants. Pipeline decisions
from these jurisdictions formed the basis of the Minnesota Court of Ap-
230
peals' sensible decision in the Scherger case.
Under the Minnesota rules governing indefinite rights of way, the lo-
237
cation of Northern's easement centered on its 1932 pipe. Minnesota
courts generally have determined the location of an indefinite way accord-
238
ing to the practical construction of the parties. The grantor possesses
across the adjacent property of the landowner. For that reason, utility
companies specifically include language in easement agreements to allow
such access. In the event that it is necessary to exercise that right of ac-
cess, the easement agreements also provide that the landowner is entitled
to be compensated for any resulting damages caused to the landowner by
such use.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Northern Natural Gas Company at 3, Bergh & Misson
Farms (No. C8-96-603).
230. See BRUCE & ELY, supra note 14, 7.02[1], at 7-3 (noting that in cases of
unrestricted easements, whose location is intentionally left imprecise, the servient
owner remains "protected by the general principle that an easement holder can-
not utilize the easement in an unreasonable manner").
231. Bruns v. Willems, 142 Minn. 473, 479, 172 N.W. 772, 774 (1919) (describ-
ing limitations on implied secondary easement to repair road); see also Reed v.
Board of Park Comm'rs, 100 Minn. 167, 172-73, 110 N.W. 1119, 1121 (1907) (us-
ing similar language to describe the limitations on implied secondary easement to
clean out a drainage ditch); supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
232. Giles v. Luker, 215 Minn. 256, 259-60, 9 N.W.2d 716, 718 (1943).
233. Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 428, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937) (quoting
Grafton v. Moir, 29 N.E. 974, 976 (N.Y. 1892)).
234. See supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 130-138 and accompanying text.
236. See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 562 N.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998).
237. See id.
238. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text. The exception is when a
way existed at the time of the grant. See Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 215,
101 N.W.2d 213, 222 (1960).
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239
first right to designate the pathway, followed by the grantee. Once lo-
cated, the course of the easement remains fixed and cannot be moved240
without the consent of both parties. These principles clearly apply to
utility and pipeline easements, and other jurisdictions have so applied241
them. As such, Northern's placement of the 1932 pine should be seen
as a designation of the easement that "fixed" its course.
Under Minnesota case law, the width of Northern's easement is that
243
necessary for reasonable use of its grant. Minnesota precedent states
that a right of way "necessarily implies the right to use a strip of land of
the width necessary to the enjoyment of the uses for which the grant was
made." 244 Another decision adds that if "the right of way is not bounded
in the grant, the law bounds it by the line of reasonable 
enjoyment."
245
Case law from other states strongly reinforces this principle.246 As such,
the width of Northern's easement is a fact question and consists of that
area reasonably necessary to exercise its rights under the grant.
C. Misinterpretation of Section 300.045
In addition to misinterpreting the common law, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court also seriously misconstrued Minnesota Statutes section247
300.045 in the Scherger decision. The court's discussion of the statute
was obscure and inarticulate, making analysis of its reasoning difficult.
However, its interpretation involved at least two serious errors.
First, the court misinterpreted the basic scope of the statute. The
court stated that the second part of section 300.04548 was "intended to
239. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
242. See Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 562 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997), rev'd, 575 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1998) (holding that Northern's place-
ment of the original pipe "fixed" the course of its easement).
243. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
244. Lidgerding v. Zignego, 77 Minn. 421, 425, 80 N.W. 360, 361 (1899).
245. Ingelson v. Olson, 199 Minn. 422, 428, 272 N.W. 270, 274 (1937).
246. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
247. Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn.
1998). As will be discussed further here, the Minnesota Legislature amended sec-
tion 300.045 in 1999 to correct the Scherger court's interpretation. See Act of May
21, 1999, ch. 184, 1999 Minn. Laws 790-91; Minnesota House of Representatives,
House Research Bill Summary, H.F. 160, 81st Legis. Sess. (Minn. 1999) (visited
Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us.hrd.bs.81.HFO160.html> (stat-
ing that the bill to amend section 300.045 was developed in response to the Scher-
ger court's denial of retroactivity to section 300.045, which prevented application
of the statute to most utility easements).
248. Now codified as subsection (c) of the statute. See MINN. STAT. §
300.045(c) (Supp. 1999).
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protect landowners from marketability of title problems caused by ease-
ments covering large tracts of land."249 This explanation is clearly incorrect.
The second part of section 300.045 targeted imprecise easements, not
large easements.2 5 0 It covered any easement where "the recorded descrip-
tion of the easement does not include a definite and specific description of
the easement."2 51 The statute redressed such uncertainty by requiring the
utility to supply a "definite and specific description" of its ill-defined
easement.252 Section 300.045 carefully addresses the central problem of
blanket utility grants: their failure to describe the easement's physical di-
253
mensions.
The court's misreading of the statutory objective is significant. By
defining the statute's target as large easements, the court implied that sec-
tion 300.045 essentially decreased their size, cutting them down to a
254
smaller area. Such a reduction, applied retroactively, might constitute a
taking under Minnesota law or expose the statute to attack on constitu-
255
tional grounds. Though the court did not pursue this point, its misun-
derstanding may have resulted in its denial of retroactivity to the statute.
Second, the court erred by denying that the second section of
300.045, now codified as subsection (c), could be enforced retroactively.256
The court's conclusion appears baffling in light of the statute's plain lan-
guage, which covered easements having a "recorded description."25' Re-
249. Scherge, 575 N.W.2d at 581 (emphasis added). The court's statement
probably reflected its belief that blanket easement grants involved "easement[s]
granted over a large defined area of property" rather than easements undefined
by the grant, which described only the servient tenement. Id.; see also supra notes
84-89 and accompanying text.
250. See MRN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998).
251. Id. (emphasis added). The 1999 amendment altered this language to
read "a definite and specific description of the location, width, or course of the ease-
ment." Act of May 21, 1999, ch. 184, 1999 Minn. Laws 790-91 (emphasis on new
language added to the statute).
252. See MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998) (recodified as MiNN. STAT. § 300.045(a)
(Supp. 1999)).
253. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
254. See MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998).
255. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("Private property shall not be taken, de-
stroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid
or secured."); see also Petition of Dreosch, 233 Minn. 274, 281, 47 N.W.2d 106, 110
(1951) ("An easement is Property, and when taken for public use the owner ordi-
narily is entitled to compensation."); Grossman Invs. v. State, 571 N.W.2d 47, 50
(Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ("A taking or damage can arise out of any interference by
the state with the ownership, possession, enjoyment or value of private property.").
256. See Scherger, 575 N.W.2d at 581 (holding that neither of the two provisions
of section 300.045 apply to the Scherger grant because it was created "before the
enactment of the statute in 1973").
257. MINN. STAT. § 300.045 (1998).
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corded easements are existing easements and clearly include easements
created before passage of the statute. The statute, in short, showed a clear.. . 258
legislative intent for retroactive application. Even Northern admitted
that the second section of 300.045 applied to utility easements predating259
the statute's passage. By ruling otherwise, the court ignored the express
intent of the Minnesota Legislature.
In May 1999, the Minnesota Legislature expressed its discontent with• 260
the court's interpretation that section 300.045 was not retroactive. The
statute now expressly states that section 300.045 applies to "every ease-
ment over private property acquired by a public service corporation, re-
gardless of when the easement was acquired or created." 261 This altera-
tion, passed by a nearly unanimous legislature, restores the statute's262
original meaning. The legislative revisions did not, however, correct
263
the court's misunderstanding of the statute's scope.
V. CONCLUSION
These decisions represent extreme and one-sided interpretations of
express easements. The opinions reveal misunderstandings of basic in-
terpretive rules, particularly the rules regarding ambiguity and reasonable
use. The holdings violate Minnesota precedents as well as the consensus
position of other states. The Scherger decision, moreover, disregards the
clear language and meaning of Minnesota Statutes section 300.045 by pre-
venting retroactive application of its second section. The court should re-
store the traditional rights of servient owners by quickly reversing these
indefensible decisions.
258. See id. The statute thus satisfied the criteria of section 645.21 of the Min-
nesota Statutes, which states that "[n] o law shall be construed to be retroactive un-
less clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature." MINN. STAT. § 645.21
(1998).
259. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 20, Schergr (No. CX-96-2319)
("Clearly, the legislature intended this section to apply to all new and existing
easements in the state.").
260. SeeAct of May 21, 1999, ch. 184, 1999 Minn. Laws 790-91.
261. See MINN. STAT. § 300.045(c) (Supp. 1999).
262. The vote in the Minnesota House of Representatives was 129 yeas, 1 nay.
SeeJOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 81st Legis. Sess. 4078 (Minn. 1999). The vote in the
Senate was unanimous in favor of the change. See JOURNAL OF THE SENATE, 81st
Legis. Sess. 2450 (Minn. 1999).
263. See MINN. STAT. § 300.045(c) (Supp. 1999). Whereas the old statute ap-
plied to grants that failed to specify the easement's "location," the amended stat-
ute applies to grants that fail to specify the easement's "location, width, or course."
Act of May 21, 1999, ch. 184, 1999 Minn. Laws 790-91. Perhaps this clarification
could be read as emphasizing that the statute targets indefinite rather than large
easements.
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